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a collective action will be deemed to be commenced as to an individual claimant,
not on the date the original complaint was filed, but on the date when the employee filed his written consent to become a party,68 the time lag between accrual of the cause of action and commencement of the collective action is increased, bringing more actions under the statute of limitations. The President,
upon approving the Act, recognized an immediate need for additional appropriations to augment the inspection and enforcement program of the Wage and
Hour Division ".... . in order to detect violations early enough to protect workers from undue losses." 69 To date no additional appropriations have been forthcoming.
Thus, despite the emergency nature of the Portal Act, a considerable revision
of the Fair Labor Standards Act seems to have taken place. Although the Portal
Act does appear to create greater certainty for employers, and does relieve them
from the allegedly tremendous burden7o of portal to portal claims, it accomplishes this at the expense of limiting, and in some cases abolishing, the rights
of workers established nine years before by the "remedial and humanitarian"
Fair Labor Standards Act. It is to be regretted ihat, in an area as vital to the
national economy as this, such major changes have been made under the guise
of an emergency without thorough examination and consideration, and without
the public scrutiny the situation demanded.

OVERLAPPING FEDERAL AND STATE REGULATION
OF LABOR RELATIONS
Even those members of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare
who opposed the passage of most parts of the Labor-Management Relations
Act gave complete approval to Section io(a), believing that the clarification of
relations between the federal Board and state boards through the amendment
of Section io(a) of the National Labor Relations Act was a wise solution to a
complex problem.' A comparison of the two sections may be made plain by setting forth Section io (a) of the NLRA, 2 with that part which is omitted from
68Pub. L.
6

No. 49, 8oth Cong. ist Sess., § 7(b) (May 14, 1947).

9H.R. Doc. No.

247,

8oth Cong. ist Sess. (1947).

70A strong case has been made to the effect that the portal-to-portal claims were not actually so financially staggering to the employers. Sugar, The Truth about "Portal to Portal,"
7 Law. Guild Rev. 23 (1947); Smethurst and Haslam, "Portal-to-Portal" and Other Retroactive Liabilities, 15 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 131 (i947). But cf. Cotter, Portal to Portal Pay, 33
Va. L. Rev. 44 (1947).

1Report of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare on S.
2, Both Cong. ist Sess., at 41 (1947).
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2National Labor Relations Act § io(a), 49 Stat. 453 (1935),
act hereinafter referred to as NLRA.
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Section io(a) of the LMRA3 in brackets, and with additions made by the LMRA
in italics:
The Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed in section 8) affecting commerce. This power
shall [be exclusive and shall] not be affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be established by agreement, [code] law, or otherwise:
Provided, That the Boardis empowered by agreement with any agency of any State or Territoryto cede to such agency jurisdictionover any cases in any industry (other than mining,
manufacturing,communications, and transportationexcept where predominantly local in
character)even though such cases may involve labor disputes affecting commerce, unless the
provision of the State or Territorialstatute applicable to the determinationof such cases by
such agency is inconsistent with the correspondingprovision of this act or has received a
constructioninconsistent therewith.

In providing that the National Labor Relations Board should have exclusive
power to prevent unfair labor practices affecting commerce, Section io(a) of
the NLRA seemed unequivocal. Some of the states, however, soon after the
passage of that Act began to exercise a power to act upon labor matters involving domestic corporations engaged in interstate commerce. The highest courts
of New York and Wisconsin adopted the position that a state board and the national Board had concurrent jurisdiction. It was their belief that the states
could regulate labor relations of any company in the state, even though involved
in interstate commerce, until the national Board chose to act. 4
The New York-Wisconsin concurrent jurisdiction view was not shaken by
Allen-Bradley Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board,S the first case in

which the United States Supreme Court considered the problem of conflict of
jurisdiction between a state board and the national Board. In that case, although the union involved claimed that the company was subject to the jurisdiction of the national Board only, the state board felt it could decide the controversy since no prior action had been taken by the national Board. Upon investigation, the Wisconsin Board found that the union was engaged in mass
picketing for the purpose of hindering the pursuit of lawful work, was threatening employees desiring to work with bodily injury, was obstructing entrance to
and exit from the factory, was picketing the homes of employees, and was interfering with the free use of public streets surrounding the factory. The Board's
3 Labor Management Relations Act § io(a), H.R.

3020,

8oth Cong. ist Sess. (Pub. L. No.

101, x947); act hereinafter referred to as LMRA.
4 "We discover nothing in the legislative history of the bill which later became the National
Labor Relations Act to give comfort or support to the claim that Congress intended to exclude
the states from the whole field of labor relations so affecting interstate commerce as to warrant
federal legislation." Wisconsin Labor Rel. Board v. Fred Rueping Leather Co., 228 Wis. 473,
488, 279 N.W. 673, 679 (1938). "We reach the conclusion, therefore, that the State Labor
Relations Board may enforce the State act at least until such time as it is ousted by the
exercise by the National Labor Relations Board of its jurisdiction under the National Act."
Davega City Radio v. State Labor Rel. Board, 281 N.Y. 13, 24, 22 N.E. 2d 145, 149 (939).
s 315 U.S. 740 (1942).
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order to the union to cease and desist from those unfair practices was upheld by
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin and then by the United States Supreme Court.
Jusice- Douglas, speaking for the Court, said, "The federal Act was not designed to preclude a State from enacting legislation limited to the prohibition or
regulation of this type of employee or union activity ..... Congress has not
made such employee and union conduct as is involved in this case subject to
regulation by the federal Board."'6 Justice Douglas cautiously stated that his
discussion was confined to the precise facts of the case and that no opinion was
advanced concerning the validity of other types or orders in cases where the federal Board had not assumed jurisdiction.7 The holding was that state regulation
of employee and union conduct not covered by the NLRA would not be condemned as an encroachment on the powers of the national Board. Although the
New York-Wisconsin concurrent jurisdiction view was not denied in the AllenBradley case, nothing was said which would indicate that the United States Supreme Court approved that view.
One limitation on state regulation of labor relations was recognized by the
Supreme Court in 1945. In Hill v. Florida,8 the Attorney General of Florida
sought to restrain a labor union and its business agent from operating within the
state until they had complied with that section of a Florida statute which provided that no person should be granted a license to act as a business agent for a
labor union who had not been a citizen and resident of the United States for
ten years, who had been convicted of a felony, or who was not a person of good
moral character. A fee of one dollar and a statement by officers of the labor union showing the applicant's authority had to accompany the application. A
board, composed of the Governor, the Secretary of State, and the Superintendent of Education made final decisions on applications.9 Justice Black stated that
the Florida statute had been so construed and applied that the union and its selected representative were prohibited from functioning as collective bargaining
agents except upon conditions fixed by Florida."° This section of the Florida
statute was held repugnant to the NLRA because it resulted in a forfeiture of
collective bargaining rights. Another section of the same statute," requiring
unions to file a report and pay a one-dollar annual fee, was also considered. This
latter section was held-in and of itself-not to be in conflict with the national
Act. But the use of an injunction for failure to comply with the requirements of
the section was held to be an application of the law in a manner resulting in conflict with the NLRA, which, under the commerce clause, was supreme.
It was not until the case of Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Board,12 decided April 7, 1947, that the United States Supreme Court was
obliged to determine the validity of the New York-Wisconsin concurrent juris6 Ibid., at

748 (italics added).
U.S. 538, 541 (1945).
(1943) C.21968, § 6.

7Ibid., at 747:

",'325

s325 U.S. 538 (i945).

",Fla. Gen. L.

9 Fla. Gen. L. (1943) C.21968, § 4.
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NOTES

diction view. From May 1943 until March 1945, the NLRB refused to hold that
units of supervisory employees were appropriate for the purposes of collective
bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the NLRA.3 During the same
period, the New York State Labor Relations Board, acting under a state Act 4
nearly identical with the federal Act, recognized these units. The foremen of two
large New York companies, being cognizant of the current policy of the national
Board, filed petitions for certification with the state Board. Although the federal Board had previously determined that the two companies were subject to
the NLRA and had certified representatives selected by various units of nonsupervisory employees at both plants, the state Board nevertheless assumed
jurisdiction and was sustained in its action by the New York Court of Appeals.S
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court it was held beyond the powers of
the state of New York to follow a policy contrary to that of the NLRB with
respect to the employee representatives of the two companies.
One aspect of the Bethlehem case has been nullified by Section 2(3) of the
LMRA,x6 which excludes any individual employed as a supervisor from the employee category. But questions of jurisdiction may yet arise under the LMRA,
in which this equivocal case may be of decided importance. The Bethlehem
Steel Company and the Allegheny Steel Corporation were clearly under the
jurisdiction of the national Board.'7/Hence when foremen from the two cor'3In Matter of Maryland Drydock Company, 49 N.L.R.B. 733, 740 (1943), it was stated,
"We are now persuaded that the benefits which supervisory employees might achieve through
being certified as collective bargaining units would be outweighed not only by the dangers
inherent in the commingling of management and employee functions, but also in its possible
restrictive effect upon the organizational freedom of rank and file employees." This case was
decided May 11, 1943, and from that date the Board repeatedly dismissed petitions for the
establishment of bargaining units comprising supervisory employees. Matter of Boeing Aircraft, 51 N.L.R.B. 67 (1943);Matterof Murray Corporation of America, 51 N.L.R.B. 94 (1943);
Matter of General Motors Corporation, 5i N.L.R.B. 457 (1943). Then on March 26, 1945,after

the applications for certification in the Bethlehem action had been filed, the National Board
indicated a change in policy, and asserted, ...... we find that all general foremen, foremen,
assistant foremen, and special assignment men employed by the Company .... constitute a
unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b)
of the Act." Matter of Packard Motor Car Company, 6i N.L.R.B. 4, 26 (2945). See Collective Bargaining by Supervisory Employees under the Wagner Act, 13 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 332

(1946).

The NLRA § 9(b), 49 Stat. 453 (1935), 29 U.S.C.A. § i5g(b) (i947), stated "that the Board
shall decide in each case whether, in order to insure to employees the full benefit of their right
to self-organization and to collective bargaining .... the unit appropriate for the purposes
of collective-bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof." Compare LMRA § 9(b) H.R. 3020, 8oth Cong. ist Sess. (Pub. L. No. ioi, 1947).
14

N.Y. Labor Law (McKinney, 1940) c. 30 §§ 700-716.

N.Y. 607, 64 N.E. 2d 352 (1946).
'6LMRA § 2(3), H.R. 3020, Soth Cong. ist Sess. (Pub. L. No. 1ox, 1947).
1S 295

X7The national board, in NLRB v. Schmidt Bakery Co., 122 F. 2d 162 (C.C.A. 4 th, 1942),
assumed jurisdiction where products of a bakery were sold only within the state of its location
on the grounds that seventy-five per cent of the material used in the manufacture of its goods
was shipped from outside the state. In Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. NLRB, 303 U.S. 453
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porations sought certification by the state Board, the important issue presented
was whether state action is precluded where the national Board concededly has
jurisdiction but has not exercised it in the specific case.
The question was not to be answered by precedent. The action of the New
York State Labor Relations Board could not be upheld on the basis of the AllenBradley case, for, to come within the rule of that case, the employee and union
conduct must not have been covered by the NLRA. Since the NLRA provided
for investigation by the national Board whenever a question affecting commerce
arose concerning the representation of employees, 8 the conduct in question was
regulated. On the other hand, the action of the state Board could not be condemned on the basis of Hill v. Florida,for interference with collective bargaining
would have to be shown if the rule of that case were to be invoked. In the Bethlehem case, collective bargaining was facilitated when the New York Board certified a bargaining unit which would not have been certified (at that time) by the
national Board.
Justice Jackson, speaking for the majority, began by stating that the initial
question was whether, Congress having undertaken to deal with the labor relationship here involved, the states could not do so. Congress had not laid down
any guides for the construction of the Act, and it was therefore necessary to consider the relation of federal and state power to the subject matter of the case to
determine whether exclusion of state authority could be implied. The Court
found that the subject matter was not so blended with national government responsibilities that its nature alone raised an inference of exclusion.
Mter apparently holding that the Act did not exclude state authority, the
Court stated that states may, under regulative statutes such as the NLRA
where effective regulation awaits the issuance of rules by an administrative
body, exercise their police power in the interval before those rules are established.
However,
.... the conclusion must be otherwise where failure of the federal officials affirmatively to exercise their full authority takes on the character of a ruling that no such regulation is appropriate or approved pursuant to the statute ..... It is clear that the
failure of the National Labor Relations Board to entertain foremen's petitions was of
the latter class.19
(1938), the cannery involved obtained all.of its fruits and vegetables locally, but the national
board took jurisdiction because substantial quantities of the cannery's products were shipped
in interstate and foreign commerce. Most of the products of the two subject corporations were
shipped to points outside the state of New York, and most of the raw materials delivered to the
plants from out-of-state. Briefs of United States (1946) Nos. 55, 76 and 12 and i6; see also
Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRE, 305 U.S. 197, 222 (1938).
18 NLRA § 9(c), 49 Stat. 453 (1935), 29 U.S.C.A. § '59 (c) (1947).

'967 S.Ct.

1026, 1030 (i947).

NOTES
Justice Jackson declared that a different problem not here decided would arise
if the reason for the national Board's refusal to take jurisdiction was not a matter of policy, but was "for budgetary or other reasons.""20

The opinion is not entirely free from ambiguity. While the Court suggested
that the Act itself did not oust state jurisdiction, there is other language which
throws some doubt upon the conclusion that it was the policy of the Board and
not the NLRA itself which prevented the exercise of jurisdiction by the state
Board. The following paragraph is an example:
The federal board has jurisdiction of the industry ..... It asserts, and rightfully so,
under our decision in the Packard case," its power to decide whether these foremen
may constitute themselves as a bargaining unit. We do not believe this leaves room for
the operation of the state authority asserted.This statement has been interpreted as an assertion that the mere fact that the
national Board has power to act is sufficient to exclude state action. Justice
Frankfurter, dissenting, believed that:
the Court's opinion carries at least overtones of meaning that, regardless of the consent of the National Board, New York is excluded from enforcing rights of collective
bargaining in all industries within its borders as to which Congress has granted opportunity to invoke authority of the National Board.'
Justice Frankfurter was convinced that the majority opinion put an end to the
convenient cooperative agreements between the national and state boards, and,
although the majority had not committed itself as to cases where budgetary
or other reasons were the cause of Board inaction, he was "unable to see how
state authority [could] revive because Congress [might-see] fit to put the Board
on short rations."46l
It must be remembered that the Court was concerned with representation,
and not unfair labor practices, in the Bethlehem case. Hence Sections 9(b) and
9(c) of the NLRA were involved, and not Section io(a). Section 9(c) provided
for investigation by the national Board "whenever a question affecting commerce arises concerning the representation of employees ..... ",2s No words of
20 bid., at io3i (1947).
"Matter of Packard Motor Car Company, 61 N.L.R.B. 4 (1945).
"67 S.Ct. 1026, 1031 (1947).
'3 bid., at 1032.
'4 Tbid., at 1033. About a month after the Bethlehem case, Justice Douglas cited it as
authority for the statement that "We recently noted that Congress can act so unequivocally
as to make clear that it intends no regulation except its own." Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 67 S.Ct. 1146, ii55 (1947).
2s kLRA
§ 9(c), 49 Stat. 453 (935), 29 U.S.C.A. § i59(c) (947). These words have not
been appreciably changed by §9(c) of the LMRA, H.R. 302o, 8oth Cong. ist Sess. (Pub. L.
No. ioi, 1947): " .... if it [national Board] has reasonable cause to believe that a question
of representation affecting commerce exists it shall provide for an appropriate hearing upon
due notice."
"The term 'affecting commerce' means in commerce, or burdening or obstructing commerce
or the free flow of commerce, or having led or tending to lead to a labor dispute burdening or
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sole power to handle representation cases appeared in the NLRA or now appear
in the LMRA. It thus seems reasonable to conjecture that if, as Justice Frankfurter supposed, the decision of the Court meant that the national Board's
jurisdiction under the NLRA was exclusive in representation cases, then,
a fortiori, the Court would also feel it was exclusive in unfair labor practice cases
where the applicable Section, io(a), included an express provision to that
effect.
/While it appears that the concurrent jurisdiction view could perhaps be
considered abated by the Bethlehem decision, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
did not submit to such an interpretation. It is not surprising that the Wisconsin
Court, two months afterwards, was still'saying, "The National Labor Relations
Board not having exercised any jurisdiction of such labor dispute the State
Board may exercise jurisdiction of it.' 6 Although the company involved in the
case was within the jurisdiction of the national Board, and although the National Labor Relations Board had certified the union as the bargaining agent of
the employees, the Wisconsin Court stated that the Bethlehem case did not
apply. That court interpreted the Bethlehem case as a holding that when the
national Board declined to designate foremen as a bargaining unit it was exercising the jurisdiction delegated to it under the federal Act, thus excluding state
27
regulation.
Tl~e Pennsylvania Supreme Court took, like Justice Frankfurter, a broader
view of the intended impact of the Bethlehem case. In PittsburghRys. Co. Substation Operators and Maintenance Employees' Case,2 that Court averred that
the clear implication of the decision is that wherever Congress has the power of
regulation over the employer-employee relationship and has acted with regard
to that relationship, state power is suspended and cannot constitutionally be
exercised.
The latte<'interpretation, prior to the passage of the LMRA, appeared unfortunate in at least one respect. The National Labor Relations Board cannot
dispose of all cases coming within its constitutional power. Budgetary limitations have in the past hampered the Board,'9 and at times there might be such
a backlog of cases that prompt hearing would be impossible.30 It is apparent
8

obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce." NLRA § 2 (7), 49 Stat. 450 (1935), 29
U.S.C.A. § 152 (7) (i947). LMRA § 2 (7), H.R. 3020 8oth Cong. ist Sess. (Pub. L. No. ioi,
1947).
6

2 International Union v. Wisconsin Employment Rel. Board,

27

N.W. 2d 875, 883 (Wis.,

1947).
27 Ibid. Perhaps the International Union case could be justified on the basis of the AllenBradley case. This would require a showing that the NLRA did not cover the union activity involved in the case.

" 54 A. 2d 891, 895 (Pa., 1947).
29U.S.

Briefs (946) Nos. 55, 76 at p. 67.
At the end of 1946, the board had 46o unfinished cases. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New
York Labor Rel. Board, 67 S.Ct. 1026, 1035 (i947).
30

NOTES

that if the fact that the national Board has jurisdiction is sufficient to prevent
the exercise of state jurisdiction, and if the federal Board is unable to dispose of
all cases over which it has jurisdiction, some employer-employee disputes will
not receive a hearing. Congress has attempted to remedy the situation in Section io(a) of the recent Act by empowering the national Board to cede jurisdiction to state agencies.3' There seems implicit in the section a recognition of the
Frankfurter-Pennsylvania interpretation of the Bethlehem case, for unless the
states have no authority in cases affecting commerce until given it by the
NLRB, the provision for ceding jurisdiction is of no use. A condition precedent
to a cession of jurisdiction is that the statute under which the state board
operates must be consistent with the corresponding provision of the federal Act
and must not have received a construction inconsistent therewith.32 This makes
employer-employee protection, in some cases, depend upon whether the state
in question has a statute consistent with the corresponding section of the
LMRA. It appears that Section io(a) will encourage state legislation consistent
with the national Act. The states have their choice between passing such legislation and construing it in a manner consistent with the national Board's construction of the federal Act, or taking no part in regulating unfair practices
which affect commerce.
Two other sections of the LMRA have sufficient effect upon federal-state
relations to deserve consideration along with Section io(a). Section 14(a)33 provides that no employer subject to the LMRA shall be compelled to deem individuals defined as supervisors as employees for the purpose of any law relating
to collective bargaining. The section narrows the effect of the Allen-Bradley
decision by prohibiting states from giving supervisors collective bargaining
rights--even in the absence of federal regulation.
Section 14(b)34 makes it clear that the LMRA does not authorize union shop
agreements under Section 8(a) (3) in states where the union shop, preferential
hiring, or any agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment are prohibited by state law. A state is free to act under
this section providing its regulations are at least as stringent as those of the
national Board, and the action may be taken without any cession from the national Board. Nearly one-third of the states have already declared closed shop
agreements unlawful.35
31 LAIRA

§ io(a), H.R. 3020, 8oth Cong. ist Sess. (Pub. L. No. ioi, i947).

32Ibid.
33 LMRA

§ 14(a), H.R. 3020, 8oth Cong. ist Sess. (Pub. L. No. 101, 1947).
Ibid., at § 14(b).
3s Ariz. L. (i947) c. 8i; Ark. Acts (1947) c. ioi; Del. Laws (1947) c. I96; § 30; Fla. Const.
Declaration of Rights, § 12; Ga. L. (I947) Act. No. i4o; Iowa Acts (1947) c. 296; La. Gen.
Stat. Ann. (Dart. 1939) § 65; Neb. Const. Art. 15 §§ 13-,5; N.C. L. (1947) c. 328; S.D. L.
34

(1947) S.B. 224; Tenn. Pub. Acts (i947) S.B. 367; Tex. Ann. Rev. Civ. St. (Vernon, 1947)
art. 52o7a; Va. Acts (1947) c. 2 §§ i-8. These provisions all seem to include union shop as well
as closed shop agreements.
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Section io(a), together with Sections 14(a) and 14(b), indicates that Congress intends the national Board to have control over labor relations affecting
commerce unhampered by state legislatures or state boards(If the Bethelehem
case is to be construed as an absolute prohibition on state regulation, state
boards may claim authority to act only when jurisdiction is ceded by the national Board. The national Board will yield jurisdiction only where the state
statutes.4re compatible with the federal Act, and where the state act has been
giyen a congenial construction./
/ There is another possibility-one which would take the exclusive control over
all labor relations out of the hands of the NLRB and allow the exercise of state
jurisdiction, even where not ceded by the national Board. It is reasonable to
suppose that Justice Jackson did not intend to bar the states except where they
were following a policy contrary to that of the national Board. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court believed that the Bethlehem opinion went no further. 6 If it did
not, there is no reason why states cannot exert jurisdiction over labor disputes
in cases affecting commerce without receiving the sanction of the NLRB, as
long as they are not following a policy opposed to that of the federal Board. For
while the LMRA does empower the NLRB to cede jurisdiction to state boards,
it does not explicitly make the power of the Board exclusive. /
It therefore becomes clear that Section xo(a) of the LMRA has not clearly
defined the respective scopes of jurisdiction of the national and state boards
unless buttressed by one of two possible interpretations of the Bethlehem case.
Until the Supreme Court undertakes to clarify the meaning of that decision,
the problem of jurisdictional conflicts will remain unsettled.
6International Union v. Wisconsin Employment Rel. Board,
1947).
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